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CASE NOTE
EVIDENCE: PRIOR CRIMES USED TO SHOW
SPECIFIC INTENT AND IDENTITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although it is a general rule that prior crimes may not be
introduced into evidence in criminal trials, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court as well as most, if not all, of the state and federal courts in this
country, recognizes certain exceptions to this rule. Prior offenses have,
in the past, been introduced when a requisite element of proof for the
defendant's conviction has not been sufficiently substantiated. Courts
have allowed the introduction of these offenses into evidence either to
infer the defendant's specific intent or to rebut doubts regarding the defendant's identity. However, before these offenses may be admitted
into evidence, it must be shown that there is a rational connection between the prior offense and the offense with which the defendant is
charged, and secondly, that the defendant was involved in the prior
misconduct. It may be required that his involvement be shown in one
of the following ways: 1) It may merely have to be proven that the
defendant performed prior acts which are of a criminal nature; or 2)
it may have to be shown that he was convicted of the prior offense.
II. THE GENERAL RULE
As stated above, the general rule is that prior crimes may not be
introduced into evidence.' The reasons for this general rule are expressed in the Wisconsin murder case of Paulson v. State:2
In a doubtful case even the trained judicial mind can hardly
exclude the fact of previous bad character or criminal tendency,
and prevent its having effect to swerve such mind toward accepting conclusion of guilt. Much less can it be expected that
jurors can escape such effect. In a case ... where it is believed
that so horrible a crime has been committed, and where naturally
and properly there is great anxiety that such outrage do not go
without retribution upon the perpetrator, as to whose identity the
field of speculation is wide, the tendency to fasten suspicion
upon some member of the community whose record is bad is
very strong, and fraught with great danger to the unfortunate
individual, however innocent.'
The defendant in this case was charged with murdering a teenage
girl. The murder occurred while the defendant was stealing money
from the girl's home. At the trial, the prosecution was permitted to
show that the defendant was convicted of larceny on two prior occasions.
1

UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903).
3Id. at 99-100, 94 N.W. at 774.
2

§180 (4th ed. 1935).
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TO THE GENERAL RULE

There are two recognized exceptions to the general rule that evidence of prior offenses cannot be introduced at a subsequent criminal
trial to prove an element of the crime charged.
A. Prior Offenses To Prove Specific Intent
When there is doubt as to whether the defendant had the specific
intent at the time he performed the acts of the crime with which he
is charged, courts have allowed introduction of prior similar criminal
acts into evidence to infer this intent. If it can be shown that the
defendant performed a criminal act (all the physical acts which are
the essentials of the crime excluding specific intent, design and motive)

two or more times, then in the words of Wigmore,
"... the recurrence of a similar result (here in the shape of an
unlawful act) tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or
other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal,
i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act.. .. 4
B. PriorOffense To ProveIdentity
If the defendant puts his identity in doubt through an alibi or by
some other means, his prior offenses may be introduced to demonstrate that his modus operandi was the same in these prior offenses
as in the crime charged. It is pointed out in Corpus Juris Secundum that
"....

where a crime has been committed by some novel or extra-

ordinary means or in a peculiar or unusual manner, evidence of
recent similar acts or crimes by accused committed by the same
means or in the same manner are provable to identify accused
as an inference from similarity of method." 5
Possibly, in Wisconsin, prior offenses may be introduced only as
probative of the defendant's identity. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
in State v. Stevens 6 stated by way of dicta that:
...it is settled that evidence of other crimes or of the similarity
of schemes of one charged with theft by fraudulent means
may be admitted for the limited purpose of identifying the defendant by means of the method of operation
as the person
7
who committed the particular crime charged.
The question is whether the court in Stevens implied that other offenses
could be admitted only to show the identity of the defendant. If such
a negative inference can be drawn, it appears that the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not give recognition to this in the 1965 case of State
v. Reynolds.8 The purpose of introducing evidence of a prior burglary
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENC E §302 (2nd ed. 1923).
22A CJ.S. Criminal Law §684 (1961).
626 Wis. 2d 451, 132 N.W. 2d 502 (1965).
7 Id. at 456, 132 N.W. 2d at 505.
828 Wis. 2d 350, 137 N.W. 2d 14 (1965).
4

5
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in that case was to imply that Reynolds had the specific intent to steal
when he and two associates broke into a school. The court did not
expressly decide whether the prior offense could be introduced to show
Reynolds' specific intent. The prior burglary was excluded because
there was no connection established between the prior burglary and
the burglary with Nrhich Reynolds was" chargedY There is no statement
in Reynolds indicating that prior offenses could not be introduced into
evidence to prove specific intent. In fact, some of the cases cited 0 in
Reynolds recognized that specific intent could be inferred by prior
offenses. It appears, however, that if a case came before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court on the sole issue of whether prior offenses could be
introduced to infer specific intent, it would be difficult to predict how
the court would decide this issue.
IV.

CRITERIA FOR INTRODUCING PRIOR OFFENSES

Two prerequisites appear to be needed before a prior criminal act
may be admitted into evidence as probative of either the defendant's
identity or his specific intent: 1) Some connection must be established
between the two events or criminal acts. 2) It must be established that
the defendant was involved in prior misconduct.
A. The Criterionof Connection
The basic question is: When should a court recognize that there
is an adequate connection between the prior offense and the offense
with which the defendant is charged? A standard for determining
whether inferences set forth in federal statutes are constitutional has
been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Tot v. United
States.:" The defendants in that case were convicted of violating the
Federal Firearms Act.1 2 This act made it unlawful for any person
convicted of a crime of violence to receive firearms or ammunition
which had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. The
act further stated that:
. .. the possession of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, 3as the case
may be, by such person in violation of this Chapter.
The particular issue in the case was whether it would be a violation of
due process to presume, from the defendant's possession of a firearm,
that it was shipped in interstate commerce.'4 Ruling that the presumption was violative of due process, the Court stated that:
9

Id. at 359, 137 N.W. 2d at 18.

10 Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912) ; Smith v. State, 195 Wis.

555, 218 N.W. 822 (1928).
"319 U.S. 463 (1943).
12 15 U.S.C. §902(f) (1941).
"3Ibid.

14 319 U.S. at 466.
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a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other
is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience.' 5

This standard was again recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Gainey.16 The statute in that case authorized
the jury to infer from the defendant's unexplained presence at an illegal still and carrying on the business of distilling liquor without the
required bond. 17 The Court ruled that according to the standard set
forth in the Tot case the statutory inference was constitutional.' 8 It
was reasoned by the Court that:
Congress was indoubtedly aware that manufacturers of illegal
liquor are notorious for the deftness with which they locate arcane spots for plying their trade. Legislative recognition of the
implication of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches
-that strangers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy. 19
From an analysis of these two United States Supreme Court cases
the rule emerges that, in order to be constitutional, a presumption or
an inference in a federal statute must be based on a rational connection between the two events involved. Wharton recognizes that the jury
is permitted to deduce the existence of the essential facts in the controversy from the existence of another fact when in "the experience
of mankind the existence of the one fact ordinarily and logically follows from the.existence of the other. ' 20 Since the statutory presumptions and also the deductions of the jury must be grounded in experience, it would seem to follow that the inference between the prior
criminal act and the ultimate crime to be proven must also be based
on experience.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Reynolds case, however,
stated that evidence may be admitted "of other occurrences in which
a defendant has participated, when such others are similar in facts and
21
close to the time of the offenses for which a defendant is on trial."
In that case, the appellant Reynolds and two associates were apprehended near a public school in Burlington, Wisconsin, and subsequently were charged and convicted for burglarizing the school. There
was evidence adduced at the trial establishing that Reynolds and his
associates did break into the school-prior to their apprehension, they
15 Id. at 467-468.

16 380 U.S. 63 (1965).

1726 U.S.C. §§5601 (b) (1)-5601 (b) (2) (1964).
Is 380 U.S. at 68.

19 Id. at 67-68.

20 1 WHARIoN, CRIMINAL EViDENCE
2128 Wis. 2d at 357, 137 N.W. 2d at

§87 (12th ed. 1955).
17.

CASE NOTE

were seen coming out of the school; one of the doors to the school
had been forcibly opened; and a person other than Reynolds was
carrying a bag of burglary tools. There was, however, no direct evidence that the breaking and entering was "with the intent to steal. ' 22
To infer this specific intent, the prosecutor tried to relate the burglary
tools carried by one of the parties, involved in the Burlington entry
with a prior and different burglary of a school in Two Rivers, Wisconsin, which had occurred a week before. Two agents employed at
an FBI laboratory were permitted to testify that bits of plaster found
in the bag containing the burglary tools at the Burlington school were
the same bits of plaster taken from the wall of the Two Rivers School.
Upon Reynolds' appeal, the state supreme court ruled that it was
error to admit the testimony of the two FBI agents. The prosecutor,
in the first instance, failed to establish either that Reynolds owned the
bag containing the burglary tools or that he was in possession of them
during the Burlington break-in. Secondly, it was not shown that Reynolds was actually involved in the Two Rivers burglary. It was conceivable, the court stated, that Reynolds could have joined up with
23
his associates after the Two Rivers affair.
It appears that the "similarity of fact and the closeness of time
test" of the Reynolds case has a basis in experience. This test would
be applicable where there have been two similar burglaries committed
in the same city on two consecutive days an.' where the defendant is
charged with the second burglary. If the prosecutor at the trial desires
to prove either that the person who committed the second burglary
was the defendant or that the defendant had specific intent to steal
the prosecutor is permitted, according to the test in the Reynolds case,
to introduce the first burglary into evidence. However, he must show
that the defendant was actually involved in this prior burglary. If he
fails to prove this, there is no basis for introducing the first burglary
as evidence. If the defendant's involvement in the first burglary can
be proven, it would appear that a rational connection could be established between it and the second burglary. When all the circumstances
of the second burglary are considered in addition to the proven fact
that he committed the first one, it appears very probable that the defendant did not commit the second break-in by accident, but that he
had a "burglarious state of mind" when he committed it. On the other
hand, although the defendant places his identification in doubt, the
proof that he committed a prior similar burglary which involved similar
techniques would be probative that *he committed the crime charged.
In Reynolds, the fact that a door of the Burlington school was
forcibly opened, that Reynolds and his associates were seen running
22 WIs.STAT. §943.10(1)
2328 Wis. 2d at 359, 137

(a) (1963).
N.W. 2d at 18.
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out of the school, and that one of Reynolds' associates was carrying a
bag of burglary tools would provide the arresting officers probable
cause to believe that Reynolds and his associates intended to burglarize
the Burlington school. Assuming that it was proven that Reynolds was
actually involved in the Two Rivers burglary, the further fact that bits
of plaster found in the bag containing burglarious tools were the same
bits of plaster as were removed from the Two Rivers school would
indicate that there was a rational connection between the two events.
B. Proof of Involvement In Prior Offenses
Once it has been established that there is a sufficient connection
between the prior crime or criminal act and the crime with which the
defendant is charged, the prosecutor's next obligation is to prove the
defendant's involvement in these prior offenses. His involvement may
be shown in one of the following ways: 1) Proof that he committed
or performed certain acts which are of a criminal nature. 2) Proof
that he was convicted of prior crimes.
1) Proof of PriorActs
There appears to be two different views as to the nature and quality
of evidence needed to establish prior criminal acts as a condition to
their being considered by the jury. One view holds that it is sufficient
to substantially establish that the defendant committed these offenses.
The other view maintains that the commission of these offenses must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Corpus Juris Secundum points out that
"... evidence of other crimes committed by the accused should
be admitted only where they are substantially established although proof beyond a reasonable doubt or proof of conviction
-24
is not generally required ....
The question is what is meant by the term "substantially established ?"
The majority opinion in the Reynolds case adheres to a proposition
similar to that stated in Corpis Juris Secundum. The state failed toestablish, the court stated, that Reynolds "actually played a role in the
Two Rivers Affair ....
-25 Justice Gordon, in his concurring opinion,
pointed out that:
. . . under the holding of the majority it is sufficient if the accused was personally involved in previous acts which were similar in facts and close
in time to those acts for which he is
28
presently being tried.

When could it be substantially established that Reynolds played a role
in the Two Rivers affair? If such prior involvement did not have to
2422A C.J.S. Criminal Law §690 (1961); People v. Rosota, 58 Cal. 2d 304,
373 P. 2d 867 (1962).
25 28 Wis. 2d at 359, 137 N.W. 2d at 18.
2628 Wis. 2d 350, 361, 137 N.W. 2d 14, 19 (1965) (concurring opinion).
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be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, how much doubt must be present
in the trial judge's mind before this evidence will be excluded?
The better rule would seem to be that the defendant's commission
of these prior acts must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. American Jurisprudence supports this view:
... [T]he courts generally require that evidence of the accused's
guilt of another crime shall not be admitted unless the proof
of the other crime is clear and sufficient to authorize a finding
of the defendant's guilt of such other crime; in other words
27
its commission must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
The 1925 Wisconsin case of Magnuson v. State28 may support the
proposition that only the act itself must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence of a prior criminal act in that case was not only
admitted into evidence but it was also left to the jury rather than the
judge, to determine whether such acts should be considered. Magnuson
was convicted of first degree murder. The victim was the wife of one
Chapman. Chapman's wife was killed by an explosion of a bomb,
which was disguised as a package and sent by mail to Mr. Chapman.
Mr. Chapman was a member of the county drainage board and had
taken part in laying out certain drainage ditches. Evidence was introduced at the trial indicating that Magnuson was opposed to this project.
There was also other evidence establishing that a dredge was blown
up shortly prior to the time a ditch was to be dredged on Magnuson's
property. The trial judge instructed the jury that the evidence concerning the blowing up of the dredge could be considered if they were
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Magnuson destroyed the
29
dredge. The Wisconsin Supreme Court approved this instruction.
The Magnuson case has never been overruled, unless by the Reynolds case. There is no statement in the Reynolds case concerning the
jury's right to determine whether Reynolds was involved in the Two
Rivers affair. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, held that it
was error for such evidence to be admitted.30 It could be presumed from
this ruling that it is not for the jury to determine whether the evidence
of other criminal acts should have a bearing on the case at trial. An
analysis of these two cases leaves two questions: 1) Should the trial
judge or the jury determine whether prior offenses should be considered? 2) What quantum of proof is needed to establish that the
defendant performed a previous act of a criminal nature?
A rule which permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of
prior misconduct of the defendant raises serious questions under the
EVIDENCE §318 (1939); Haley v. State, 84 Tex Crim. 629, 209
S.W. 675, 3 A.L.R. 779 (1919).
28 187 Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749 (1925).
291d. at 134, 203 N.W. at 754.
30 28 Wis. 2d at 359, 137 N.W. 2d at 18.
27 20 Aii. Ju-
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fifth amendment.3 1 At the outset it must be recognized that in most
circumstances the defendant in a criminal case is under some compulsion to testify and to deny the offense. In many instances the decision
not to place the defendant on the stand is prompted by considerations
other than his ability to deny his participation in the crime. 32 When
to this compulsion to testify is added the further compulsion to explain his alleged participation in other prior misconduct, his right to
be free from compulsory self-incrimination may be violated. The defendant may be able to explain his apparent involvement in prior similar criminal acts, but unable to explain his involvement in the offense
with which he stands charged. Should he take the witness stand to
explain only these prior offenses, the jury is inescapably led to the
conclusion that he could not explain the present offense. Should he
be questioned concerning the present offense, he is forced either to
commit perjury, to convict himself or to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination before the jury. This dilemma is incapable of resolution: to this choice a defendant may not be placed. 33
As the prosecutor may not comment on the defendant's failure to
testify in his own behalf, it would appear reasonable that he may not
attempt to force the defendant to the stand by the accumulation of
34
ruled that it was a
alleged prior misconduct. Griffin v. California
violation of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to permit a prosecutor in a state criminal proceeding to make comments
concerning the defendant's failure to testify. The Court stated that
"what the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another." 35 It appears, analogously, that when prior criminal acts are introduced into evidence,
the court is also solemnizing the defendant's silence into evidence against
him.
"No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .. "
32 Harris B. Steinberg made the following observations regarding placing a
defendant on the -witness stand:
Generally speaking, a defendant doesn't do himself any good on the
stand, except in rare instances. He can be cross-examined as to his
criminal record if he has one. There may be very real doubt as to how
he will stand up under any hostile cross-examination. Many accused
persons make poor witnesses. Some of them may be unprepossessing
in appearance. Their speech may be rough and untutored. Their earnest
denials just do not carry much force, while the admission against interest made during cross-examination usually sticks out like a sore thumb.
Interview of Harris B. Steinberg of the New York Bar by Monrad G. Paulsen of the Columbuia University School of Law in JOINT COMMITTEE ON
31

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE AND THE

A CRIMINAL
(1961).
33 Cf. De Luna v. United States, 308 F. 2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
34 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
35 Id. at 614.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE PROBLEM OF

DEFENSE
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2) Proof of PriorConvictions
Justice Gordon in his concurring opinion in the Reynolds case took
the position that ".

.

. it [is] essential to limit the prosecution to prior

convictions in offering proof of previous, related conduct as a means
of proving the accused's intent to commit the crime currently
charged."3 8 Among the cases he cited for authority, only one, United

States v. Haynes,37 specified (by way of dicta) that a prior conviction
was necessary. The court in the Haynes case cited no direct authority
for its position. Haynes and one Barnes, in that case, were arrested
for the federal offense of illegally selling alcohol. Two cans of moonshine liquor were found in Haynes' truck. In cross-examining Haynes,
the prosecutor asked him questions relating to the sale of moonshine
liquor. The court felt that these questions were asked only to impeach
the defendant's testimony and not to show his intent, motive or design.
It was thus ruled that only a former conviction for a felony or a
misdemeanor amounting to crimen falsi would be admissible to impeach
Haynes' credibility. 38 The court then suggested that even if the question was proper to show intent, motive, identity, scheme or plan,
"... it would have been necessary for the government to show
the defendant had been convicted of selling moonshine liquor
at a time that would have been material to the offenses laid in
the indictment."3 9
If it must be shown that the defendant was guilty of the prior
offenses rather than that he performed acts of a criminal nature, then
proof of the prior conviction or convictions would be most desirable, if
not necessary. The defendant, not being convicted of such offenses,
may be said to be indirectly charged with a crime without the constitutional" or statutory 41 safeguards of being informed of the nature
and cause of the offense.
V.

CONCLUSION

The defense attorney in Wisconsin has available to him several
means of attacking the introduction of prior misconduct into evidence.
Proof that the defendant was convicted of these prior offenses would
have to be introduced if the prosecutor not only attempted to prove
that the defendant committed these offenses, but also that he was guilty
of them. If it only has to be proven that the defendant committed
prior criminal acts, his right against self-incrimination may be violated
because of an undue compulsion to testify. When the Reynolds case
is compared with the Magnuson case, it is questionable in Wisconsin
36

28 Wis. 2d 350, 361, 137 N.W. 2d 14, 19 (1965)

(concurring opinion).

37 81 F. Supp. 63 (W. D. Penn. 1948).
38 Id. at 68.
39 Ibid.

40 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI Wis. CONST. art. I, §7.
41 WIS. STAT. §§955.05, 955.075, 954.02 and 960.36

(1963).
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what quantum of proof of the defendant's involvement in these prior
offenses is needed. The majority opinion of the Reynolds case indicated that it is sufficient to prove that the defendant was involved
in these acts. Once it has been proven that the defendant has committed the prior criminal acts, it must be established that there is a
rational connection in experience between the prior acts and the crime
charged. If the two criminal acts are similar in fact and close in time,
it appears that there is a rational connection between the two. In certain circumstances, it may be argued that a rational connection is not
established just because the two events are similar in fact and close in
time. If the prior crime is introduced into evidence to prove the defendant's specific intent in the crime charged, the defense attorney
may attempt to persuade the Wisconsin Supreme Court that, on the
authority of the Stevens case, prior crimes may be introduced only to
rebut any doubt of the defendant's identity.
ALLEN

J.
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